Collective Action Federalism and Its Discontents
Neil S. Siegel*
An increasing number of scholars argue that the Commerce Clause is best
read in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the
Articles of Confederation. The work of these “collective action theorists” is
reflected in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius. Writing for four Justices, she stressed the “collectiveaction impasse” at the state level to which the Affordable Care Act responds.
In its purest form, a collective action approach maintains that the existence
of a significant problem of collective action facing two or more states is both
necessary and sufficient for Congress to address the problem by relying on the
Commerce Clause. Unlike nationalist defenders of unlimited federal commerce
power, a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated conduct
substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. Unlike federalist
defenders of limited federal commerce power, a collective action approach does
not focus on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct, or
between regulating and requiring commerce.
Accordingly, nationalists may agree that a collective action problem is
sufficient for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree
that it is necessary. By contrast, federalists may agree that a collective action
problem is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will
disagree that it is sufficient.
This Essay anticipates such criticism. Regarding the nationalist critique of
a collective action approach, I argue that the nationalist “substantial effects”
test imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce
Clause. I also argue that nationalists may define multistate collective action
problems too narrowly. In addition to races to the bottom, collective action
problems include interstate externalities that do not cause races to the bottom.
Broadening the definition of multistate collective action problems to
include interstate externalities gives rise to the federalist objection that every
subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as a
collective action problem. Federalists may further object that the Commerce
Clause is limited to “Commerce.” In response, I argue that “Commerce” is best
understood broadly to encompass many social interactions outside markets, as
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Professors Jack Balkin and Akhil Amar have urged. I also argue that a
collective action approach need not validate unlimited federal commerce power.
Specifically, I identify three ways of limiting the kinds of interstate externalities
that justify use of the Commerce Clause.

Introduction
In the 1780s, the young nation faced serious problems, and the Articles
of Confederation prevented it from addressing them effectively. Most
significantly, the states made a habit of discriminating against commerce
from other states and refusing to contribute their fair share of money and
troops to the national treasury and military.1 The nation could not solve these
problems for three primary reasons: they transcended the boundaries of any
one state; the states faced substantial impediments to collective action; and
the federal government lacked constitutional authority to act effectively when
the states were unable to act collectively.2
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 responded to these failures of
governance. Echoing Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan, the Convention
instructed the midsummer Committee of Detail that Congress would be
empowered to legislate in, among other things, “those Cases to which the
States are separately incompetent.”3 The Committee of Detail “changed the
indefinite language of Resolution VI into an enumeration . . . closely
resembling Article I, Section 8” as adopted,4 including its authorizations of
federal power to regulate interstate commerce, tax, and raise and support a
military.5
An increasing number of legal scholars have drawn from this history in
offering structural accounts of the scope of the Commerce Clause.
Specifically, “collective action theorists,” as I shall call these scholars, have
argued that the commerce power is best read in light of the collective action
problems that the nation faced under the Articles of Confederation, when
Congress lacked the power to regulate interstate commerce. Included in their

1. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION 24–28, 47–48, 102–08, 167–68, 188–89 (1996) (cataloguing the problems with
the Articles of Confederation); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 44–
46, 106–08 (2005) (same); Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 616–23
(1999) (same).
2. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 121–24 (2010) (using the logic of collective action to
explain the failures of the Articles of Confederation).
3. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 131–32 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966).
4. Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV.
1335, 1340 (1934).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3, 11–16.
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ranks are Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, Robert Cooter, Andy Koppelman,
Donald Regan, and myself.6
The work of these collective action theorists appears to be reflected in
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius (NFIB).7 In one of the most important opinions of her tenure,
Ginsburg stressed the “collective-action impasse”8 at the state level to which
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)9 responds. Ginsburg
insisted that “States cannot resolve the problem of the uninsured on their
own,”10 and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined this part of her
opinion.11
This is a significant, if underappreciated, development. Ginsburg did
not argue merely that Congress could have rationally concluded that the
conduct of the uninsured, as a general class, substantially affects interstate
commerce. In addition, she argued that the scope and nature of the problem
rendered the federal government better situated than the states to solve it.12
To be sure, Ginsburg did not reject the substantial effects test in favor of an
alternative that would make the existence or nonexistence of a multistate
collective problem dispositive of the Commerce Clause inquiry.13 But she
did place special emphasis on the collective action problems that the ACA’s

6. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 107–08; Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1
(2010); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 115–16; Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the
Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554,
554–57 (1995); Neil S. Siegel, Free Riding on Benevolence: Collective Action Federalism and the
Minimum Coverage Provision, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 30 (2012); see also ANDREW
KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT ON HEALTH CARE REFORM
42–43, 71, 155 n.7 (2013) (drawing from works by collective action theorists in arguing that the
ACA’s minimum coverage provision is valid Commerce Clause legislation).
7. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
8. Id. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (“Congress’[s] intervention was needed to overcome this collective-action impasse.”).
9. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21,
25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
10. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2612 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
11. Id. at 2609.
12. See id. Justice Ginsburg explained why states expose themselves to economic risk by passing health care reforms on their own:
States that undertake health-care reforms on their own thus risk “placing themselves in
a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or competitors.”
[Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).] See also Brief for Health Care for All,
Inc., et al. as [Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Urging Reversal on the Minimum
Coverage Provision Issue at 4, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398)] (“[O]ut-of-state residents continue to seek and receive
millions of dollars in uncompensated care in Massachusetts hospitals, limiting the
State’s efforts to improve its health care system through the elimination of
uncompensated care.”). Facing that risk, individual States are unlikely to take the
initiative in addressing the problem of the uninsured.
Id. at 2612.
13. See id. at 2616.
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minimum coverage provision can reasonably be understood to ameliorate14—
both alone and in combination with the ACA provisions that prohibit
insurance companies from denying people coverage based on preexisting
conditions, canceling coverage absent fraud, charging higher premiums
based on medical history, and imposing lifetime limits on benefits.15
Ginsburg’s opinion suggests that four Justices deem the logic of
collective action constitutionally pertinent to the scope of Congress’s
commerce power. Depending on changes in the Court’s composition in the
years ahead, this plurality may become a majority. Accordingly, it is
especially important at this time to understand and critically evaluate the
work of collective action theorists.
In its purest form, a collective action approach to the Commerce Clause
maintains that the existence of a significant problem of collective action
facing two or more states is both necessary and sufficient for Congress to
address the problem by relying on the commerce power. In the context of
judicial review, a collective action approach asks whether Congress had a
rational, or a reasonable, or some other more demanding basis to conclude
that such a collective action problem exists.16 A collective action approach
focuses on the distinction between problems whose solutions require
individual (that is, separate) action by states, and problems whose solutions
require collective action by states.
Unlike nationalist defenders of robust federal commerce power
(nationalists), a collective action approach does not ask whether the regulated
subject matter substantially affects interstate commerce in the aggregate. 17
Unlike federalist defenders of limited federal commerce power (federalists),
a collective action approach does not focus on the formal distinction between
economic and noneconomic conduct, or on the formal distinction between
regulating and requiring commerce. 18 Accordingly, nationalists may be
willing to agree that a collective action problem is sufficient for Congress to
invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will disagree that it is necessary. By
14. Id. at 2613–14. The ACA requires, among many other things, that most lawful permanent
residents of the United States either maintain a minimum level of health insurance coverage (the
minimum-coverage provision) or else pay a certain amount of money each year (the sharedresponsibility payment). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ch. 48, 124 Stat. at 244–50.
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1(a), 300gg-5, 300gg-11, 300gg-12 (Supp. V 2012).
16. The question of what the Commerce Clause means is separate from the question of how
deferential courts should be in deciding whether Congress has acted consistently with its meaning.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 11, 20
(Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (distinguishing “the question of what the Constitution
means and how to be faithful to it” from the question of “how a person in a particular institutional
setting—like an unelected judge with life tenure—should interpret the Constitution and implement
it through doctrinal constructions and applications”).
17. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Four Constitutional Limits that the Minimum Coverage Provision
Respects, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 591, 601 (2011) (describing the nationalist position).
18. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 604–05 (2010) (endorsing both
formal distinctions identified in the text).
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contrast, federalists may be willing to agree that a collective action problem
is necessary for Congress to invoke the Commerce Clause, but they will
disagree that it is sufficient.19
I anticipate such criticism by nationalists and federalists alike in this
Essay, which is part of a larger effort to provide a structural theory of the
expanse and limits of congressional power and state power in Article I,
Section 8 and certain other parts of the Constitution. 20 Regarding the
nationalist critique of a collective action approach, I argue that the primary
nationalist alternative—the substantial effects test as applied for decades
before the Court’s 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez21—imposes no
judicially enforceable limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause. No
member of the late Rehnquist or early Roberts Courts has been prepared to
embrace this implication, and contemporary American constitutional culture
appears to reject it. I also argue that nationalists may define a multistate
collective action problem too narrowly, which may cause them to conclude
that a collective action approach would excessively limit the scope of the
commerce power.
By a “collective action problem,” collective action theorists typically
mean a situation in which individually rational action by states leads to
collectively irrational results.22 This could arise with a race to the bottom (or
top) among the states. In such a situation, states share the same basic
objective but have incentives to act in ways that make it difficult to achieve
the objective.23 Collective action problems, however, are not limited to races
among the states. A collective action problem may also arise in cases of
interstate spillovers that do not involve races among the states.24 When states
impose external costs on sister states, a solution to the problem will require
collective action by the affected states, which they often will not be able to
accomplish on their own.25
Broadening the definition of a multistate collective action problem to
include interstate externalities invites the federalist objection that every
subject Congress might want to address can plausibly be described as
requiring collective action by the states. (This is not the only federalist
19. It is, of course, oversimplified to divide the universe of constitutional interpreters into
“nationalists,” “federalists,” and “collective action theorists.” Many constitutional interpreters do
not fall cleanly into one category or another. Nonetheless, these stylized categories reflect reality at
least roughly, and they render the analysis that follows analytically more tractable.
20. I call this theory “the Collective Action Constitution.” For relevant writing, see generally
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2; Siegel, supra note 6; and Siegel, supra note 17. For additional work
I have done on this subject, see my articles cited infra notes 75, 124, 133, and 155.
21. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
22. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 117.
23. Siegel, supra note 6, at 46.
24. See id. at 46–47 (discussing spillovers such as pollution across state lines and the cross-state
economic effects of racial discrimination).
25. See id. (arguing that collective action may be required in cases of pollution and racial
discrimination).
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objection; another, which I will address, is that the Commerce Clause
contains the word “Commerce.”) If every problem Congress might want to
address can reasonably be portrayed as a collective action problem, then a
collective action approach—like the pre-1995 substantial effects test—
imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause.
A collective action approach, however, need not justify unlimited
federal commerce power. In the context of judicial review, resources are
available to limit the kinds of interstate externalities that justify use of the
Commerce Clause. As I argue below, courts should deem psychological
externalities inadmissible in commerce power cases. When Congress uses
the Commerce Clause—unlike when it uses the spending power—it need not
be willing to pay to vindicate the psychological concerns of people in one
state about the well-being of people in other states. Moreover, judicial
review should turn not just on the existence of an interstate externality, but
also on its significance and on the extent to which the federal law at issue
meaningfully addresses it. Finally, courts should impose a reasonableness
inquiry in the context of judicial review, in contrast to genuine rational basis
review.
So implemented, a collective action approach offers a multigenerational
synthesis of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence from
1937 through the end of the Rehnquist Court, justifying federal commerce
power that is very broad but not limitless. For example, the approach
reconciles the validations of Commerce Clause authority in Wickard v.
Filburn 26 and Gonzales v. Raich 27 with the invalidations of Commerce
Clause authority in Lopez and United States v. Morrison.28 Moreover, the
rejection of Commerce Clause authority for the minimum coverage provision
by five Justices in NFIB, while warranting criticism from a collective action
perspective, is ultimately reconcilable with the post-New Deal synthesis.
Part I addresses the nationalist critique of a collective action approach to
the Commerce Clause—namely, that it excessively limits federal power.
Part II addresses two primary objections of federalists—namely, that any
approach to the Commerce Clause must attribute meaning to the word
“Commerce,” and that a collective action approach justifies unlimited federal
commerce power. A brief Conclusion summarizes the argument.
I.

The Nationalist Critique

Nationalists are likely to view a collective action approach as working
much better as a principle of inclusion than as a principle of exclusion. As
Professor Michael Dorf has conveyed, “It’s hard to conceive of a genuine
collective action problem for the States that wouldn’t give rise to regulatory

26. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
27. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
28. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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authority for Congress under the Commerce Clause.”29 At the same time,
Professor Dorf has resisted my past characterizations30 of Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States 31 and Katzenbach v. McClung 32 as collective
action cases:
The Southern states were not trying to mandate civil rights but
couldn’t because of a race to the bottom or spillover effects; quite the
contrary. The 1964 Civil Rights Act was a matter of the dominant
national opinion on civil rights simply displacing dissenting regional
and state opinion on the matter. It’s possible to spin the cases as
addressing collective action problems (as you do), but to my mind
doing so robs the notion of a collective action problem among the
States of its explanatory force.33
For Professor Dorf it is preferable “simply to say, as the Court more or less
said in these cases, that the Commerce Clause reaches instances of activity
(or inactivity) having substantial effects on interstate markets, whether or not
national regulation of such activities (or inactivities) is needed to solve a
collective action problem.”34
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has voiced similar concerns. He has
distinguished between the argument that a collective action problem is
sufficient to rely on the Commerce Clause and the argument that such a
problem is necessary. He deems the former claim an “insight [that] is
tremendously valuable.”35 He is “very skeptical” about the latter claim.36 He
prefers the substantial effects test and deems a collective action analysis
unnecessary when the substantial effects test is satisfied. 37 Judging from
exchanges with other defenders of robust federal power, the reactions of
Professor Dorf and Dean Chemerinsky are typical.
Two responses to the nationalist critique seem appropriate. First, the
preferred alternative among nationalists—the substantial effects test 38 as
applied before Lopez—imposes no judicially enforceable limits on the
Commerce Clause. The pre-Lopez version of the substantial effects test

29. E-mail from Michael C. Dorf, Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Univ. Law Sch.,
to author (May 21, 2011, 9:23 AM) (on file with author).
30. Siegel, supra note 6, at 46–47.
31. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
32. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
33. Dorf, supra note 29 (emphasis omitted).
34. Id.
35. E-mail from Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of Cal.,
Irvine Sch. of Law, to author (Aug. 2, 2011, 10:49 PM) (on file with author).
36. Id.
37. See id. (arguing that the substantial effects test is satisfied by the ACA’s minimum coverage
provision and questioning the necessity or utility of further justifying the provision using a
collective action analysis).
38. The court often dropped the “substantiality” requirement. See, e.g., Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (“The Commerce Clause reaches . . . . those activities affecting
commerce.”).
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asked whether Congress rationally could have concluded that the regulated
conduct—whether economic or noneconomic in nature—affects interstate
commerce in the aggregate.39 No possible or actual federal law would fail
this test, even if one includes a “substantiality” requirement.
In Lopez, for example, Justice Breyer was most persuasive in showing
how Congress reasonably could have concluded that the possession of guns
in school zones, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.40
If one extends the time horizon, there is a demonstrable relationship between
school violence and student academic performance, and between student
academic performance and national economic performance.41 Justice Breyer
was so persuasive that Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion, did
not try to rebut these effects. Instead, he changed the subject, pausing to
consider the implication of Justice Breyer’s argument, which was that the
Commerce Clause was unlimited.42
By contrast, Justice Breyer was least persuasive in explaining how his
analysis was compatible with judicially enforceable limits on the commerce
power. 43 Like Solicitor General Drew Days at oral argument, 44 Justice
Breyer was unable or unwilling to name a single potential federal law that
would be beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause if the Gun Free School
Zones Act were upheld. 45 It is hard to think of conduct that, taken
cumulatively, does not substantially affect interstate commerce.
Nationalists may view this aspect of the substantial effects test as a
virtue, not a vulnerability. Instead of advocating judicially enforceable limits
on the Commerce Clause, they tend to stress the political safeguards of
federalism.46 Nationalists are right to stress them. Political constraints, not
39. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981) (“A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a
congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.”).
40. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 618–24 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (analyzing
the effect of guns in and around schools on education and commerce).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 564–65 (majority opinion) (stating that under the Government’s position, “we are
hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate”).
43. See id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “special way in which guns and
education are incompatible” and the impact of education on economic well-being made Lopez the
“rare case” where noncommercial conduct has “so significant an impact upon commerce” that it is
regulable under the Commerce Clause).
44. For a discussion of the Solicitor General’s performance at oral argument in Lopez, see
Siegel, supra note 17, at 591, 593–94.
45. Justice Breyer’s performance is the more revealing of the two. Unlike the Solicitor General, a Justice has no institutional responsibility to defend the constitutionality of almost all federal
laws.
46. The seminal article is Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954), in which Professor Wechsler suggests that “the national political process in the United
States . . . is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the
domain of the states.” Id. at 558; see also, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
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judicially enforceable limits, explain why no Justice worries about much of
what the Court’s longstanding doctrine allows, including a minimum wage of
$1,000 an hour and a prohibition on buying unhealthy foods. To be sure, one
might draw a different lesson from such examples—namely, that the political
process tends to protect against congressional actions that will be unpopular
with large segments of the American public, not that the political process
protects federalism. But by protecting against such federal laws, the political
process does help to protect federalism, at least to some extent—even if this
protection is not attributable to the role of the states in the national political
process, and even if Congress is not otherwise motivated to protect
federalism.
Regardless, no Justice appointed over the past three decades has
accepted that the political safeguards of federalism are the only safeguards
available. To reiterate, Justice Breyer devoted great energy to denying this
implication of his position in Lopez. 47 Every present Justice appears to
believe in a national government of limited, enumerated powers, and none
insists that the federal judiciary has no role in preserving these limits.48
I do not know why every current Justice seems to reject the
nonjusticiability approach of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.49 I have an intuition, however, after observing and participating in
the fight over health care reform over the past few years. No one involved in
the debate thought it persuasive to argue that the ACA’s minimum coverage
provision is within the scope of the Commerce Clause just because any
possible federal law is within the scope of the commerce power as far as
judicial review is concerned. No one thought it unimportant to have an
answer to the “Lopez question.” Perhaps this is just a function of having a
Court with a federalist majority, but I am not so sure. Given the extent to
which hypotheticals involving congressional mandates to buy broccoli or
American cars resonated in the public imagination,50 it may not be tenable in

NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 2 (1980) (arguing that “state interests are forcefully represented in
the national political process”); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 219 (2000) (arguing that American federalism
has been protected not by “the formal constitutional structures highlighted in Wechsler’s original
analysis,” but “by a complex system of informal political institutions (of which political parties
have historically been the most important)—institutions that were not part of the original design, but
have nevertheless served to fulfill its objectives”); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to
Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 360 (noting that
the judicial focus in vindicating federalism is now “on the nature of the political process responsible
for making the federalism-related decisions”).
47. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 624–25 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that his position would not
“expand the scope” of the Commerce Clause).
48. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2366 (2011) (unanimous opinion) (stating
that “action that exceeds the National Government’s enumerated powers undermines the sovereign
interests of States” and that such “unconstitutional action can cause concomitant injury”).
49. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
50. See, e.g., James B. Stewart, How Broccoli Landed on Supreme Court Menu, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/business/how-broccoli-became-a-symbol-in-
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contemporary American constitutional culture to advocate abandoning all
judicially enforceable limits on the Commerce Clause. A collective action
approach identifies a functional limit on federal commerce power, one that
seeks to authorize and limit the federal government to regulate what it
regulates best.51
A second response to the nationalist critique is warranted. Nationalists
may entertain too restricted an understanding of what qualifies as a collective
action problem involving multiple states. No doubt such problems include
races to the bottom (or top) among the states, such as the historic problems of
“unfair competition” caused by the absence of laws in certain states banning
child labor or requiring minimum wages and maximum hours.52 In a race to
the bottom, all (or most) of the states share the same objective (such as
national defense or a national free market), but they must overcome a
collective action problem in order to achieve the objective.53 A collective
action approach plainly justifies use of the Commerce Clause to target such
problems.
But a collective action rationale is not limited to races among the states.
Collective action problems also include situations in which states pursue
different objectives in ways that cause significant spillover effects in other
states. Heart of Atlanta and McClung were such cases. Of course the
Southern states were interested in promoting racial discrimination, not
discouraging it. But the collective action problem caused by racial
discrimination was not the fact that Southern states wanted to abandon
discrimination but were unable to do so individually. Rather, the collective
action problem lay in the fact that Southern states, by practicing racial
discrimination, created a significant burden on commerce with those states
that did not practice racial discrimination.54 In other words, Professor Dorf
focuses on the wrong states in the quotation above.55 Southern states were
not impeded from combating racial discrimination because of the conduct of
non-Southern states. On the contrary, racial discrimination by Southern
states imposed negative externalities on non-Southern states.

the-health-care-debate.html (discussing the use of hypotheticals involving broccoli and American
cars in public discourse over health care reform).
51. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2 (developing the theory of collective action
federalism).
52. See, e.g., id. at 160–62 (discussing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)).
53. If unanimity were required, then there would typically be insuperable impediments to
collective action by the states. For example, a distinct minority of states (or just Rhode Island)
would have defeated any effort to abandon the Articles of Confederation in favor of a more
powerful central government. See U.S. CONST. art. VII (providing that ratification of the
Constitution by nine out of thirteen states would suffice).
54. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 6, at 37 (“Businesses in states that do not permit discrimination
may alter their employment and production policies in order to cater to consumers and clients in
jurisdictions that permit (or even expect) discrimination.”).
55. See supra text accompanying note 29.
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In promoting an apartheid social order, Southern states made it
substantially more difficult for African-Americans and other racial minorities
to travel interstate for purposes of business, education, and tourism. The
State of California so argued in its amicus brief in Heart of Atlanta:
California industry is a prime recipient of government contracts,
which can necessitate travel to the nation’s capital or defense
installations in other states. Californians serve in the armed forces of
our nation, which frequently requires them to travel through and reside
in sister states during their period of service. Citizens of California, in
the course of their business and employment, must utilize places of
public accommodation throughout the United States.
Of no less significance to our national well-being is interstate
travel for educational and recreational purposes, including visitation of
our great national shrines located in other states.56
The Green Book, which helped African-Americans to find accommodations
while on the road in the Jim Crow South, has come to symbolize the
impediments to interstate travel that Southern states imposed.57
Moreover, Jim Crow practices in the South led to the Great Migration of
African-Americans to Northern cities, with all of the social problems
associated with an influx of cheap labor.58 “Immigration from discriminating
states will put pressure on housing, wages, and working conditions in more
egalitarian states, especially if the new immigrants are used to working at
lower wages and under inferior working conditions.” 59 These external
effects of Southern racism were demonstrable, not merely plausible or
hypothetical.
Internalization of these interstate externalities required
collective action by the states, which only Congress could provide.
Accordingly, a collective action approach to the Commerce Clause
justifies federal commerce power over discrimination affecting interstate
commerce.
And the problem of discrimination affecting commerce
illustrates a more general point. Properly understood, a collective action
approach authorizes substantially broader federal commerce power than
nationalists may presuppose.
To be sure, a collective action defense of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
does not adequately reflect our moral and constitutional intuitions about why
the federal government may dismantle a regime of public and private racial
discrimination. Of course our primary objection to racial discrimination, like
our main objection to sex discrimination, sounds not in interference with
commerce, but in human equality and liberty. But underscoring the equality

56. Brief of the State of California as Amicus Curiae at 5–6, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (No. 515), 1964 WL 81384, at *5–6 (footnotes omitted).
57. See, e.g., Celia McGee, The Open Road Wasn’t Quite Open to All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/books/23green.html.
58. Balkin, supra note 6, at 37.
59. Id.
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and liberty values compromised by various forms of discrimination is just a
way of suggesting (without demonstrating) that the Court has erred in
disabling Congress from ever regulating private conduct under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment.60 It is just a way of suggesting, for example,
that United States v. Morrison should have been an easy win for the federal
government under Section Five.61 The structural logic of the enforcement
clauses of the Civil War Amendments62 does not commend inquiry into the
existence or nonexistence of multistate collective action problems.63 On the
contrary, the enforcement clauses of the Civil War Amendments give
Congress authority to regulate the internal policy choices of state
governments concerning certain subject matters regardless of collective
action problems facing the states. 64 From a structural perspective, such
federal power is central to the meaning of the Civil War and the purposes of
Reconstruction.
Of course, stressing how discrimination diminishes equality and liberty
is not an argument in favor of the pre-Lopez substantial effects test in
Commerce Clause litigation. The substantial effects test is equally oblivious
to the profound interest people have in being free from various forms of
discrimination, public and private.
II.

The Federalist Critique

Reassuring nationalists that a collective action approach would not
severely limit the commerce power may encourage federalists to scream
“gotcha!” for at least two reasons. First, federalists may observe that

60. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 61927 (2000) (prohibiting Congress from
using its Section Five power to regulate private action); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 46
(1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The assumption that [the Fourteenth Amendment] consists wholly
of prohibitions upon State laws and State proceedings in hostility to its provisions[] is unauthorized
by its language. The first clause . . . is of a distinctly affirmative character.”). Justice Harlan wrote
that “[t]he citizenship thus acquired” by African-Americans, “in virtue of an affirmative grant from
the nation, may be protected, not alone by the judicial branch of the government, but by
congressional legislation of a primary direct character.” Id. This was “because the power of
Congress is not restricted to the enforcement of prohibitions upon State laws or State action. It is, in
terms distinct and positive, to enforce . . . all of the provisions—affirmative and prohibitive, of the
[A]mendment.” Id.
61. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619–27 (holding that § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, which provided a private civil damages remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, was
beyond the scope of Congress’s enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2.
63. This observation, however, hardly suffices to refute the “state action” requirement imposed
on Section Five legislation by the Civil Rights Cases and Morrison. One way to demonstrate the
impropriety of this requirement is to follow Justice Harlan’s lead, see supra note 60, by focusing on
the affirmative character of the Citizenship Clause of Section One.
64 . See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the constitutional
prohibition on slavery and involuntary servitude within the United States); id. amend. XIV, § 5
(authorizing Congress to enforce Section One’s Citizenship Clause and guarantees of due process
and equal protection); id. amend. XV, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the constitutional
prohibition on racial discrimination in voting by states or the federal government).
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interstate externalities are pervasive, so that any problem can be
characterized as requiring collective action by two or more states—and
therefore as justifying use of the Commerce Clause. But if that is right,
federalists may urge, then federal commerce power is limitless under a
collective action approach, just as it is under the version of the substantial
effects test that nationalists embrace.
Turning to judicial review in particular, federalists may underscore
certain considerations that may seem to render this conclusion inescapable.
One is the tradition of judicial deference to acts of Congress.65 Another is
the empirical uncertainty surrounding the significance of many interstate
externalities and the adequacy of Congress’s response to them.66 If courts
ask merely whether Congress had a rational basis to believe that federal
regulation would ameliorate a multistate collective action problem,
federalists might think, then deferential courts will always uphold federal
legislation.
Federalists may be inclined to scream “gotcha!” for a second reason. In
their view, the Commerce Clause does not justify federal power to solve any
and all collective action problems. Rather, this provision includes the word
“Commerce,” which limits the kinds of problems “among the several
States”67 that Congress may use the commerce power to address—namely,
those problems that are “commercial” or “economic” in nature. Moreover,
some (though not all) federalists may insist that the Commerce Clause
includes the word “regulate,”68 which further limits the kinds of problems
that Congress may use the Clause to address—namely, those problems that
involve preexisting “activity.”69 The joint dissent in NFIB appeared to voice
these objections to a collective action approach. 70 In response to Justice
Ginsburg’s portrayal of the ACA as meaningfully addressing problems that

65. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.) (“Our permissive reading of these [enumerated] powers is explained in part by a general
reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders.”); Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803,
1820 (2010) (“Respect for a coordinate branch of Government forbids striking down an Act of
Congress except upon a clear showing of unconstitutionality.”); see also Steven G. Calabresi, “A
Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 752, 808 (1995) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s past record is one of . . . general deference to
national [laws].”).
66. Cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 182 (“In order to establish the existence of a collective
action problem among the states, does Congress need a plausible rationale, some evidence, or
substantial evidence?”).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (Roberts, C.J.) (“The power to
regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.”).
70. Id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he decision to forgo
participation in an interstate market is not itself commercial activity . . . . [I]f every person comes
within the Commerce Clause power . . . by the simple reason that he will one day engage in
commerce, the idea of a limited Government power is at an end.”).
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the states cannot solve on their own, the dissent wrote that “Article I contains
no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-a-national-problem power.”71
To my mind, the first criticism poses the most significant challenge to
collective action approaches to the Commerce Clause. Although one can
define collective action problems broadly or narrowly, 72 there is an
entrenched presumption of constitutionality in enumerated powers litigation,
one that goes back at least as far as McCulloch v. Maryland. 73 This
presumption has particular force on empirical questions in light of
Congress’s superior fact-finding ability and democratic legitimacy to resolve
empirical uncertainties. 74 As long as the Court continues to respect the
presumption of constitutionality, 75 there will likely be greater cause for
concern that collective action theory will remove judicially enforceable limits
on the commerce power than that it will unduly limit the Commerce Clause.
This may help to explain why a collective action approach has been
embraced more by those who defend broad federal commerce power than by
those who oppose it, and why it has been criticized more by those who
oppose broad federal commerce power than by those who defend it. I will
consider each criticism in turn, although I will do so in reverse order for
purposes of analytical clarity. That is, I will first address the meaning of the
word “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause, and I will then address the
meaning of the phrase “among the several States.”76
A.

First Objection: The Commerce Clause Says “Commerce”

The first federalist criticism of a collective action approach to the
Commerce Clause is that just because a problem is “among the several

71. Id. at 2650. My friend Randy Barnett has voiced a similar objection:
Unless they voluntarily choose to engage in activity that is within Congress’s power to
regulate or prohibit, the American people retain their sovereign power to refrain from
entering into contracts with private parties, even when commandeering them to do so
may be convenient to the regulation of commerce among the several states.
Barnett, supra note 18, at 634.
72. For a discussion, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 152–55, in which the authors suggest
that the choice between broad and narrow definitions of interstate externalities may follow
“predictable political lines.”
73. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). For a good discussion of
the presumption, see generally Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of
Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1729–31 (2013).
74. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 704 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“[L]egislators, not judges, have primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from
empirical fact.”).
75. A majority of the Court respected the presumption to a significant extent in NFIB. For a
discussion, see Neil S. Siegel, More Law than Politics: The Chief, the “Mandate,” Legality, and
Statesmanship, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS 192–214 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013).
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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States” does not make it “Commerce.”77 The objection, in other words, is
that the commerce power does not authorize Congress to address all
multistate collective action problems. Rather, it empowers Congress to
ameliorate just those problems that involve “Commerce,” a term that the
Lopez and Morrison Courts properly viewed as limited to “commercial” or
“economic” interactions.78
Federalists are right to point out that any plausible interpretation of the
constitutional text must offer an account of the word “Commerce” in the
Commerce Clause.79 A collective action approach is primarily a structural
approach. Structural approaches do not contradict the constitutional text.
Rather, they give meaning to the text by explaining how various parts of the
Constitution work, or should work, in practice.80

77. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2650 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[The Constitution] enumerates not federally soluble
problems, but federally available powers. . . . Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solve-anational-problem power.”).
78. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (“Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that
by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly
one might define those terms. . . . It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of . . . a commercial transaction . . . .” (footnote omitted));
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611 (2000) (“Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case
law demonstrates that in those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate
activity . . . , the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.” (citing Lopez, 514
U.S. at 559–60)).
79. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101, 116 (2001) (“In none of the sixty-three appearances of the term ‘commerce’ in The
Federalist Papers is it ever used to unambiguously refer to any activity beyond trade or
exchange.”).
80. Consider, for example, the theory of collective action federalism that I have articulated with
Professor Cooter. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2. Although the theory is consistent with the
constitutional text, the theory is, first and foremost, neither textualist nor originalist nor
consequentialist. It is, rather, primarily an account of an important part of the American
constitutional structure. The theory seeks to interpret most of the clauses of Article I, Section 8 by
drawing inferences from the relevant structures and relationships that the Constitution establishes—
namely, a federal system that presupposes the continued existence of the states and that endows the
federal government with authority to solve problems that the states cannot address effectively on
their own. Using modern economics, collective action federalism pursues a consequentialist inquiry
to identify the logic of such problems and to explain how federalism can ameliorate them.
Resolution VI of the Virginia Plan, see supra note 3 and accompanying text, and the recorded
statements of influential Framers matter to the theory because such materials provide important
evidence of the federalist structure that was planned; they offer illuminating evidence of how an
important component of the constitutional machine was supposed to function in practice. The
Federalist Papers, for example, are relevant to our structural account even though they had little
impact on the ratification debate.
It might have turned out that this original plan for the proper interpretation of Section 8 ceased
to make sense over time. But that is not what happened regarding the distinction between
individual and collective action by states; it continues to make good sense of this part of the
American constitutional structure today, as modern economics helps to confirm. Consequences
matter to collective action federalism not because its structural account is instrumentalist all the way
down, but because structural accounts are always in part consequentialist, regardless of how they
are presented.
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Federalists err, however, if they believe that collective action
approaches read the word “Commerce” out of the Commerce Clause.
Collective action theorists offer persuasive evidence that the Court’s
“commercial” or “economic” interpretation of the word “Commerce” is not
the best available interpretation. For example, Professor Jack Balkin, who
endorses a collective action approach to the commerce power, has disputed
the Court’s “commercial” interpretation of the term “Commerce.”81 “In the
eighteenth century,” he argues, “‘commerce’ did not have such narrowly
economic connotations. Instead, ‘commerce’ meant ‘intercourse’ and it had
a strongly social connotation. ‘Commerce’ was interaction and exchange
between persons or peoples.”82
Similarly, Professor Akhil Amar writes that the term “commerce”
originally applied to more than economic interactions: it “also had in 1787,
and retains even now, a broader meaning referring to all forms of intercourse
in the affairs of life, whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by
explicit markets.” 83 Amar further argues that this broader reading of
“Commerce” is structurally most sound:
[It] would seem to make better sense of the [F]ramers’ general goals
by enabling Congress to regulate all interactions (and altercations)
with foreign nations and Indian tribes—interactions that, if improperly
handled by a single state acting on its own, might lead to needless
wars or otherwise compromise the interests of sister states.84
In accord with the views of Balkin and Amar, the Marshall Court in Gibbons
v. Ogden 85 defined “Commerce” broadly as “intercourse,” and thus as
including navigation.86
My work with Professor Cooter has been agnostic about whether the
Court and supportive commentators87 or Professors Balkin and Amar have

81. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 6, at 15–18.
82. Id. at 1; see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 138–82 (2011) (defining “commerce” as “intercourse”).
83. AMAR, supra note 1, at 107.
84. Id.
85. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
86. Id. at 189–90. Marshall reasoned:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The
mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations, which
shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of
the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing
rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or
of barter.
Id.
87. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL.
L. REV. 623, 649 (concluding that “[c]ommerce can mean a good deal more than trade—and the fact
that it includes navigation is important evidence that it did—while meaning a good deal less than
interaction”).
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the better of this argument.88 In solo work, I have applied both the Court’s
economic interpretation as a requirement of governing law, and a collective
action approach as an interpretation and justification of pre-NFIB law.89 I
have done so in order to establish that the ACA’s minimum coverage
provision is within the scope of the Commerce Clause even if one accepts the
Court’s “economic” definition of “Commerce.”90 I am persuaded, however,
that the Balkin–Amar interpretation of “Commerce,” while very broad, is
also likely correct.
For example, a quick Google search of “commerce definition” produces
this initial set of definitions of the word “commerce”:
Noun
1. The activity of buying and selling, esp. on a large scale.
2. Social dealings between people.91

The first hit below these two definitions produces three definitions from the
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary:
Definition of COMMERCE
1: social intercourse : interchange of ideas, opinions, or sentiments
2: the exchange or buying and selling of commodities on a large scale
involving transportation from place to place
3: sexual intercourse92

Such definitions, and definitions like them in the Oxford English
Dictionary, 93 suggest that conceiving of “commerce” broadly—as
encompassing social intercourse—is no great leap beyond the constitutional
text. And, of course, the sexual connotation of “intercourse” endures, which
may explain why my less seasoned students giggle when I teach Gibbons.

88. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2 (focusing on the distinction between individual
and collective action by states, not on the distinction between economic and noneconomic conduct).
89. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 17, at 594 (discussing four constitutional limits on the scope of
the Commerce Clause, including a discussion of collective action limits and limits preventing
congressional regulation of noneconomic conduct).
90. See id. (concluding that the ACA’s minimum coverage provision respects several actual or
potential constitutional limits on the scope of the Commerce Clause); Siegel, supra note 6, at 34
(concluding that the minimum coverage provision is constitutional because it addresses economic
problems of collective action facing the states).
91. Commerce Definition, GOOGLE SEARCH, http://www.google.com (search for “commerce
definition”).
92. Commerce, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commerce.
93. See 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “commerce” as,
inter alia, (1) “Exchange between men of the products of nature or art; buying and selling together;
trading; exchange of merchandise”; (2) “Intercourse in the affairs of life; dealings”; (3) “Intercourse
of the sexes”; (4) “Interchange (esp. of letters, ideas, etc.)”; and (5) “Communication, means of free
intercourse”).
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True, the primary conception of “commerce” today focuses on market
interactions. Consider, for example, the regulatory jurisdiction of the
Department of Commerce.94 Even so, a change in principal meaning over
time is no reason for courts to invalidate acts of Congress that meet the
broader definition of “Commerce” but not the narrower one. The primary
meanings today of other terms of art in the Constitution—such as “Militia,”95
“Magazines,” 96 “Misdemeanors,” 97 “Republican,” 98 “domestic Violence,” 99
and “Reside”100—are also different from what they were at the time of the
founding.
Their original meanings, however, continue to control
interpretation of the Constitution.101
Federalists on and off the Court will reject the Balkin–Amar
interpretation of “Commerce.” In addition to disputing the historical
evidence, they may fear that the commerce power is limitless absent a narrow
definition of “Commerce.” But such fears are overstated. The effect of the
Balkin–Amar conception of commerce is not to remove all limits on the
commerce power. The effect, rather, is to move constitutional analysis away
from the formal question of whether Congress is regulating a commercial
problem to the functional question of whether Congress is regulating an
interstate problem—that is, to whether commerce is “among the several
States.” This analytical move requires an analysis of collective action, which
is a structurally more sensible place to look for limits on the Commerce
Clause.
Even as federalists reject the Balkin–Amar interpretation of
“Commerce,” collective action reasoning may be informing their

94. See 15 U.S.C. § 1512 (2006) (“It shall be the province and duty of [the Department of
Commerce] to foster, promote, and develop the foreign and domestic commerce, the mining,
manufacturing, and fishery industries of the United States . . . .”).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions . . . .”).
96. Id. cl. 17 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise . . . Authority . . . for the
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .”). This
provision obviously does not refer to reading material.
97. Id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States,
shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
See AMAR, supra note 1, at 222 (observing that
“‘Misdemeanor’ in Article II was best read to mean misbehavior in a general sense as opposed to a
certain kind of technical criminality”).
98. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”). This provision obviously does not refer to one of the two
major political parties in the United States in modern times.
99 . Id. (“The United States . . . shall protect each of [the States] . . . against domestic
Violence.”). This provision obviously does not refer to spousal abuse.
100. Id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
Today, “reside” is often used in distinction from “domicile.”
101. See BALKIN, supra note 82, at 37 (discussing the examples of “domestic Violence” and
“Republican”).
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determinations of whether the conduct that Congress seeks to regulate is
economic in nature. In other words, federalist Justices appear to answer the
question of whether the conduct targeted by Congress is “economic” in
nature by bundling in collective action logic. It is not always obvious how to
identify what the regulated conduct is, nor is it always obvious how to decide
whether that conduct is economic. Why, for instance, is personal use of
marijuana for medicinal purposes pursuant to state law “economic
activity”?102 Why is growing wheat on one’s own land to feed one’s family
and livestock “economic activity”?103 The Court upheld federal regulation of
both under the Commerce Clause, ostensibly on the ground that they were
part of a larger class of economic activity.
Writing for a Court that included Justice Kennedy, in Gonzales v. Raich
(the case about federal power to regulate medical marijuana use), Justice
Stevens relied upon Wickard v. Filburn (the case about federal power to
impose a wheat quota). Stevens read Wickard as “establish[ing] that
Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself
‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to
regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market in that commodity.”104 The Court’s reasoning seemed to turn not on
the inherently economic character of the general class of conduct subject to
federal regulation, but on its interstate character. Specifically, the Court
seemed concerned about the collective action problems that would impede
separate state regulation of the interstate wheat and marijuana markets. 105
The Court’s ostensibly formal conclusion about the nature of the regulated
conduct may have resulted from an implicit collective action inquiry into the
interstate scope of the problem. If this interpretation is correct, then a
collective action approach may be informing the reasoning of those who
think they reject it. A straightforward analysis of collective action problems
would seem to be more transparent.
Of course, even if federalists were right that a collective action approach
was incapable of sufficiently limiting federal power or making sense of the
word “Commerce” in the text, they would still need to defend their own

102. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that the Commerce Clause allows
Congress to regulate the personal possession and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes pursuant
to state law authorizing such possession and use).
103. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Clause allows
Congress to regulate wheat grown for personal consumption or use).
104. Raich, 545 U.S. at 18.
105. See, e.g., id. at 19. The Court alluded to a collective action problem:
[O]ne concern prompting inclusion of wheat grown for home consumption in [the
regulation reviewed in Wickard] was that rising market prices could draw such wheat
into the interstate market, resulting in lower market prices. The parallel concern
making it appropriate to include marijuana grown for home consumption in the CSA is
the likelihood that the high demand in the interstate market will draw such marijuana
into that market.
Id. (citation omitted).
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preferred constitutional limits against charges of arbitrariness. As I have
written elsewhere, whether or not the distinction between economic and
noneconomic conduct explains when Congress is regulating “Commerce,” it
does not explain when that commerce is “among the several States.” 106
Federalists in essence assume that the regulated conduct is interstate in scope
if it is commerce and intrastate in scope if it is not commerce. That seems
hard to defend formally or functionally. Formally, the text suggests an
Interstate Commerce Clause, not an Any Commerce Clause. Functionally,
the federal government is not necessarily better than the states at regulating
economic problems, and the states are not necessarily better than the federal
government at regulating noneconomic problems. This is because economic
matters may not implicate collective action problems for the states, and
noneconomic matters may implicate collective action problems for the
states.107
What about the Court’s most recent Commerce Clause case, NFIB v.
Sebelius? The distinction five Justices drew between regulating and
requiring commerce is even more difficult to defend as an independent limit
on Congress.108 I have elsewhere examined the problems with this distinction from the standpoints of constitutional text, structure, history, precedent,
and consequences.109 Here I will observe only that the distinction between
prohibiting (or allowing) a purchase on the one hand, and requiring a
purchase on the other—between regulating commerce and compelling
commerce—has nothing to do with whether the regulated conduct is
interstate or intrastate in scope. If states may mandate private action when a
commercial problem is intrastate in scope, then the federal government
should be able to mandate private action when a commercial problem is
interstate in scope. Collective action theorists will therefore be inclined to
reject the conclusion of five Justices in NFIB that the minimum coverage
provision is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause.110

106. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 184 (“However adequate it may (or may not) be for
purposes of defining ‘Commerce’ in Clause 3, the distinction between economic and noneconomic
activity seems mostly irrelevant to the problems of federalism; it does not explain when an activity
exists ‘among the several States’ and when it exists within a state.”); Siegel, supra note 6, at 48
(“Even if the economic–noneconomic categorization can suffice as a rough definition of
‘Commerce,’ it cannot define when such commerce is ‘among the several States’ and when it is
internal to one state.”).
107. This point is stressed in Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 164.
108. I offer no view here of whether this conclusion of five Justices is “holding” or “dicta.”
The answer, it seems to me, turns on whether Chief Justice Roberts was entitled to apply the
“classical” canon of constitutional avoidance instead of the “modern” canon. For a discussion, see
Siegel, supra note 75, at 198–200.
109. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 41–54.
110. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.)
(“The Framers gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200
years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this understanding. There is no
reason to depart from that understanding now.”); id. at 2649 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (“[I]t must be activity affecting commerce that is regulated, and not merely the failure to
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That being said, the conclusion of these five Justices can be reconciled
with a collective action approach. A constitutional ban on using the
commerce power to impose a purchase mandate rests on a narrow
interpretation of the term “regulate” in the Commerce Clause. Such a ban
does not rest on an interpretation of the phrase “among the several States,”
which is the language that collective action theory is best equipped to
construe. Accordingly, more than collective action logic is needed to
persuasively reject the view that a purchase mandate is beyond the scope of
the commerce power, just as more than collective action logic is needed to
define the word “Commerce” in the Commerce Clause. 111 To reject the
conclusion of five Justices in NFIB, what is most needed is the
straightforward observation that the term “regulation” has long been
understood broadly in American constitutional law. It has been understood
to encompass prohibitions, permissions, and requirements.112
B.

Second Objection: The Commerce Clause Has Limits
The upshot of the analysis so far is that the words “Commerce” and
“regulate” in the Commerce Clause should be interpreted broadly. There is,
however, a potential problem with having the expanse and limits of the
commerce power turn on an analysis of collective action problems “among
the several states.” In economics, an externality is an interdependence in the
utility or production functions of different actors. 113 Thus, an “interstate
externality” is an interdependence in the utility or production functions of

engage in commerce. . . . Our test’s premise . . . rests upon the Constitution’s requirement that it be
commerce which is regulated. If all inactivity affecting commerce is commerce, commerce is
everything.”).
111. Similarly, more than collective action logic is needed to persuasively reject the Court’s
anticommandeering principle, another independent limit on the commerce power that the Court has
imposed even when the federal law at issue was obviously directed at solving serious, multistate
collective action problems. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175–76 (1992)
(invalidating provisions of a 1985 federal law that required states either to take title to low-level
radioactive waste produced within their borders or else to pass certain regulations governing
disposal of the waste, on the ground that both options involved unconstitutional commandeering of
the states’ legislative and administrative apparatuses). New York and Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997), which also enforced the anticommandeering principle, are nonetheless
reconcilable with collective action approaches to the Commerce Clause because such approaches do
not reject all other independent limits on congressional power.
112. See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Judge Silberman wrote:
At the time the Constitution was fashioned, to “regulate” meant, as it does now, “[t]o
adjust by rule or method,” as well as “[t]o direct.” To “direct,” in turn, included “[t]o
prescribe certain measure[s]; to mark out a certain course,” and “[t]o order; to
command.” In other words, to “regulate” can mean to require action, and nothing in
the definition appears to limit that power only to those already active in relation to an
interstate market. Nor was the term “commerce” limited to only existing commerce.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. See, e.g., Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153 n.143 (“An interstate externality refers to
interdependence in the utility functions of individuals in at least two states.”).
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actors in different states.114 This interdependence may take one of two basic
forms. First, it may involve the imposition of material costs or benefits
without paying for them (material externalities).115 An example is pollution
in State A that migrates and harms the physical health of residents of State B.
Second, this interdependence may involve the imposition of psychological
costs or benefits without paying for them (psychological externalities).116 An
example is pollution in State A that stays put but causes residents of State B
to object on moral grounds that private industry in State A is harming the
health of residents of State A.
Interstate externalities in this technical sense are pervasive, particularly
if one broadens the time horizon. In Lopez, to reiterate, Justice Breyer was
right that guns in schools impact violence in schools, and that violence in
schools eventually impacts national economic performance, so that the ways
in which states regulate (or do not regulate) guns in schools (eventually) have
external effects in other states. 117 Accordingly, an approach to the Commerce Clause that turns exclusively on the existence of any sort of interstate
externality risks blowing up the idea of a national government of limited,
enumerated powers.118
To avoid this consequence, a collective action approach has two
primary options. First, it can enforce collective action limits indirectly
through legal doctrine that employs a conceptually imperfect but relatively
determinate proxy for multistate collective action problems. 119 I will call this
the “indirect approach.” Alternatively, a collective action approach can
enforce collective action limits directly by limiting the kinds of interstate
externalities that justify Commerce Clause legislation. I will call this the
“direct approach.”
1. The Indirect Approach.—One could commend a proxy approach to
the Commerce Clause. Indeed, one could attempt to justify the contemporary
Court’s distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” conduct in just
this way. 120 The Court’s economic–noneconomic distinction may be de-

114. Id.
115. Id. at 152, 153 n.143, 172–73.
116. Id. at 152–53.
117. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
118. I also referenced Justice Breyer’s Lopez dissent in critiquing the substantial effects test,
but this does not imply that the substantial effects test is the same as a test that turns on interstate
externalities. While substantial effects on interstate commerce are potential evidence of interstate
spillover effects, the two kinds of effects are conceptually distinct. Externalities are limited to
effects that are external to the market. They are external to the market because they are unpriced.
The Court’s current doctrine is thus overinclusive.
119. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004)
(distinguishing questions of constitutional meaning from the formulation of implementing
doctrines).
120. Cf. Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs
Exception, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 139, 159 (2001) (“[T]he Court’s attention to where the causal

2013]

Collective Action Federalism

fended as roughly correlated with the existence or nonexistence of collective
action problems involving multiple states, even if some (or much) economic
conduct does not cause collective action problems involving multiple states,
and even if some (or much) noneconomic conduct does cause such
problems.121
I am skeptical of such an approach for two reasons. First, as noted in
the previous section, the question of whether something is “Commerce” may
not have much to do with whether it is “among the several States.” This is
because economic conduct does not characteristically cause collective action
problems for the states, and noneconomic conduct is not characteristically
free of collective action problems. Accordingly, Congress is not generally
better than the states at regulating “economic” problems, and the states are
not generally better than Congress at regulating “noneconomic” problems.
Second, the costs of a relatively poor proxy may be particularly high in
this setting because the Commerce Clause licenses federal coercion of
individuals.
To the extent that constitutional federalism distributes
regulatory power vertically in part to prevent unjustified federal interference
with individual liberty (a point of emphasis among opponents of the
ACA),122 it follows that the costs of commerce power regulations that do not
solve multistate collective action problems may be particularly high. To
illustrate the potential coerciveness of commerce power regulations, the
Commerce Clause may usefully be contrasted with the Taxing Clause.123
Professor Cooter and I have developed an effects theory of the tax
power, according to which there is a substantive, anticoercion limit on the
scope of the Taxing Clause.124 Whereas taxes characteristically dampen the
conduct subject to the exaction, penalties characteristically prevent the
conduct.125 It is just because taxes dampen conduct without preventing it that
taxes raise revenue. If the exaction is relatively modest in amount and thus is
a tax, many individuals subject to it reasonably can opt out of federal
regulation by paying the tax. By contrast, if the exaction is very high in
amount and thus is a penalty, almost everyone subject to it has no reasonable
choice but to engage in the congressionally favored conduct. The exaction
may be as coercive as congressional use of the Commerce Clause.126 The
chain starts—i.e., with whether the regulated activity is itself ‘commercial’ or ‘non-commercial’—
seems to stem from the Court’s reluctance to attempt to draw lines at any later point in the chain of
economic interactions.”).
121. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 164.
122. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“Federalism . . . protects
the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that laws enacted in excess of delegated
governmental power cannot direct or control their actions.”).
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
124. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects
Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012).
125. Id. at 1229–30.
126. For greater specification of what it means for a federal exaction to be relatively modest or
very high in amount, see generally id. The key distinction is between dampening conduct and
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Court’s tax power analysis in NFIB tracks the effects theory almost
exactly.127
Professor Cooter and I have written elsewhere that the tax–penalty
distinction helps to preserve limits on the Commerce Clause. 128 The
distinction stops Congress from taking a regulation backed by a penalty that
is beyond the scope of the commerce power, relabeling the penalty a tax, and
imposing it under the Taxing Clause. I have just shown something else—that
the tax–penalty distinction helps to preserve limits on the Taxing Clause
itself. Congress must always respect the particular constitutional constraints
on use of a given enumerated power, not all of which concern the existence
or absence of a collective action problem. 129 The tax–penalty distinction
ensures that Congress uses the tax power only in ways that are consistent
with revenue raising. Congress need not intend to raise revenue as a primary
objective in order to rely on the tax power—from the very beginning,
Congress has used the tax power for both revenue-raising and regulatory
purposes.130 But congressional exercise of this power must result in revenue
raising.131 The tax–penalty distinction guarantees that it will.132
In contrast to the Taxing Clause, there is no substantive anticoercion
limit on the scope of the commerce power. 133 Not only may Congress
require people to pay very large sums of money for violating valid
Commerce Clause regulations, but it may also prosecute violators
criminally.134 Accordingly, the harm to the constitutional structure is likely
to be greater when the judiciary allows Congress to regulate intrastate
commerce than when it allows Congress to tax for intrastate regulatory
purposes. Instead of using a relatively unreliable proxy for problems that are

preventing conduct. To make this determination, we counsel looking primarily to the material
characteristics of the exaction: whether it is high relative to the benefit of almost everyone from
engaging in the assessed conduct, and whether the amount one must pay increases with
intentionality and repetition. Secondarily, we advise looking to the expressive form of the exaction.
See generally id.
127. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Foreword: Academic Influence on the Court, 98 VA. L. REV.
1189, 1190–91 (2012).
128. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 124.
129. In other words, Section 8 as a whole gives Congress the tools it requires to solve all
multistate collective action problems. But each enumerated power in Section 8 does not give
Congress the power to address every conceivable collective action problem facing the states.
130. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 124, at 1204–10 (providing examples from different eras
of American history).
131. See id. at 1224.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 124–27.
133. There is also an anticoercion limit on the scope of the spending power, which I explore
elsewhere. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy or Dragoon:
Unity in Taxing and Spending Under the General Welfare Clause (May 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
134. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding a criminal provision of the
Controlled Substances Act under the Commerce Clause).
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interstate in scope, a collective action approach should find ways to limit the
kinds of interstate externalities that justify Commerce Clause legislation.
2. The Direct Approach.—There is no neutral or objective way to limit
the kinds of interstate externalities that are admissible in a collective action
analysis of the Commerce Clause. For example, people disagree in
ideologically predictable ways about whether interstate public goods are few
or many in number.135 They also disagree about whether interstate markets
are largely self-regulating.136 Even so, resources are available that have the
potential to attract broad support. I will note three of them.
First, courts should rule out psychological externalities as justifying use
of the commerce power.137 To be sure, psychological externalities can be
real and pervasive in a country in which most citizens self-identify as
Americans, particularly after a natural disaster, terrorist attack, or other
cataclysmic event.138 Americans care about whether other Americans live or
die, have clean air and water, have access to food and shelter, etc. On the
more meddlesome side, Americans may also care about what other
Americans read, watch, and do in their free time. Professor Amartya Sen
used as an example the preferences of two people, one a “prude” and one not,
regarding whether the other should read a book that the prude deems obscene
and the non-prude deems good literature. 139 It is apt to describe such
psychological externalities as busybody preferences.
Regardless of whether particular psychological externalities are
normatively attractive, allowing them to justify federal power risks
vindicating the federalist objection that a collective action approach confers
unlimited congressional authority. Professor Sen’s point was that negative
psychological externalities pose a threat to individualism in economic theory
by making Pareto improvements impossible. 140 In the face of such
externalities, every deviation from the status quo that would make one party
better off would necessarily make some other party worse off.141 Similarly,

135. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 152.
136. For a discussion, see id. at 152–53.
137. Balkin, supra note 6, at 44; see also Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153–54 (reserving
judgment on this question).
138. See, e.g., Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic State, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 387, 404–
06 (2005) (recounting instances in American history where public support for humanitarian relief
initiatives was used in arguments countering constitutional objections to the proposed measures).
139. Amartya Sen, The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 155 (1970).
The book that Professor Sen used in his example is Lady Chatterly’s Lover by D.H. Lawrence. Id.
140. Specifically, Professor Sen demonstrated that preferences about other people’s preferences
(second-order preferences) undermine the utility of Pareto efficiency as a normative criterion. See
id. at 157 n.6 (“The difficulties of achieving Pareto optimality in the presence of externalities are
well known. What is at issue here is the acceptability of Pareto optimality as an objective in the
context of liberal values, given certain types of externalities.”).
141. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153 & n.144.
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psychological externalities pose a threat to state regulatory autonomy in
constitutional theory by potentially justifying unlimited federal power.
The tradition of cost–benefit analysis in economics neither categorically
excludes nor categorically includes psychological externalities. Rather,
economists have tended to handle the issue of psychological externalities by
crediting such externalities only if there is a demonstrated willingness to pay
to vindicate one’s moral concerns. Cheap talk does not suffice. 142 This
intellectual tradition can be deployed to help justify the contemporary
Court’s deference to Congress regarding whether particular federal
expenditures promote the general welfare,143 but it does not justify admitting
psychological externalities into a collective action analysis of the Commerce
Clause.
In conditional spending cases, Congress conditions federal funds to the
states or private entities on the agreement by recipients to act in ways that
Congress cannot simply require. In South Dakota v. Dole,144 for example,
the Court upheld a federal law that conditioned five percent of federal
highway funds on the agreement by recipient states to impose a 21-year-old
drinking age.145 By using the conditional spending power in this and other
ways, Congress may be able to achieve regulatory objectives that it may not
otherwise be able to achieve.146 The Dole Court, for instance, assumed for
purposes of analysis that the Twenty-First Amendment would prohibit
Congress from imposing a national drinking age directly.147
Significantly, however, Congress’s efforts to achieve regulatory
objectives through use of the conditional spending power are not cost free.
On the contrary, Congress is paying to vindicate whatever regulatory
concerns it has.148 Accordingly, psychological externalities may be available
to justify much conditional spending. If psychological externalities are
admissible, then the highway deaths on intrastate roads caused when young
adults drink and drive may impact the general welfare. If only material
142. For a discussion, see id. at 153.
143. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987) (“The level of deference to
the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether ‘general
welfare’ is a judicially enforceable restriction at all.” (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91
(1976) (per curiam))).
144. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
145. Id. at 211–12. The Dole Court identified four constitutional limits on conditional federal
spending: (1) the spending must be for the general welfare; (2) the condition must be clearly stated;
(3) the condition must be related to the purpose(s) of the federal spending program; and (4) the
condition must not violate an independent constitutional limit. Id. at 207–08.
146. Id. at 207 (“Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative
fields[]’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional
grant of federal funds.” (citation omitted)).
147. Id. at 206.
148. See Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875, 883 n.34 (2008)
(arguing that while the Spending Clause “might allow Congress to enact legislation that would go
beyond the limits of its other main sources of authority,” still “Congress must literally pay a price,
both in treasury dollars and political capital, for such expansions”).
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externalities are admissible, then the problem of highway deaths on intrastate
roads is more likely to be local in nature.
The propriety of taking psychological externalities into account when
Congress is willing to pay is one way to understand the longstanding judicial
practice of deferring completely to congressional determinations of whether
particular federal expenditures promote the “general Welfare.” 149 In
principle, welfare is “general” (in the language of the General Welfare
Clause) when and only when commerce is “among the several States” (in the
language of the Commerce Clause).150 Specifically, welfare is “general” or
“among the several States” when the federal government can obtain it and
the separate states cannot—that is, when spillovers pose a collective action
problem for the states. Both bits of constitutional language reference a
problem of collective action involving at least two states.
In practice, however, Congress’s need to pay to advance the general
welfare only in conditional spending power cases may justify a less
demanding judicial inquiry into the interstate scope of the regulatory
problem. The need for Congress to pay helps to ensure that it is not engaging
in cheap talk and thus sensibly limits its use of the Spending Clause. 151
Allowing Congress to spend based on psychological externalities, whose
existence and scope may change over time, also helps to make sense of
Justice Cardozo’s statement for the Court that the concept of the general
welfare is not “static.”152 “Needs that were narrow or parochial a century
ago,” he wrote, “may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the
Nation.”153
To be sure, when Congress demonstrates its willingness to pay, it is not
the same as when an individual demonstrates such willingness. Not only is
Congress spending other people’s money, but it can also raise taxes to
support more spending, and it can deficit spend. Even so, Congress’s ability
to keep spending is limited; it is not cost free for Congress to work its will
through the spending power. Indeed, anticommandeering doctrine perceives
a constitutionally significant difference between simply requiring states to
regulate on Congress’s behalf and offering states money if they agree to

149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
150. For a discussion, see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 119.
151. The Dole Court, at the end of its opinion, mentioned that a “financial inducement offered
by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). But the
Court upheld the drinking-age condition on the ground that Congress was offering only “relatively
mild encouragement to the States.” Id. Twenty-five years later, in NFIB, the Court held for the first
time that a condition attached to a federal funding program was unconstitutionally coercive, with
the Justices fracturing three ways on whether or why the condition was coercive. Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608, 2641–42, 2662–66 (2012). For a theory of coercion
in conditional spending cases that seeks to bring some clarity to this newly important constitutional
question, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 133.
152. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
153. Id.
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regulate on Congress’s behalf. 154 Only the latter alternative requires
Congress to internalize at least some of the costs of its regulatory
objectives.155 This cost-internalization rationale for the anticommandeering
principle is stronger than the Court’s strained analysis of political
accountability.156
The Commerce Clause is different from the conditional spending power
on the key question of whether Congress has demonstrated a willingness to
pay. When resting on the Commerce Clause, Congress need not demonstrate
any willingness to pay to vindicate the psychological concerns of people in
one state for the welfare of people in other states.157 Congress need simply
impose the requirement. Limiting a collective action analysis to material
externalities avoids the unboundedness of an inquiry into nonmaterial
externalities—into preferences about other people’s preferences—when there
is no requirement to pay.
In addition to ruling out psychological externalities as justifying use of
the commerce power, there is a second way to limit the kinds of interstate
externalities that count in a collective action analysis of the Commerce
Clause. Judicial review should turn not just on the existence of an interstate
externality, but also on its significance and on the extent to which the federal
law at issue meaningfully addresses it. Consider, for example, the regulated
conduct in Lopez—firearm possession in a school zone.158 The way that one
state regulates this problem does not appear to undermine how other states
regulate this problem, and the external effect of guns in schools on national
productivity is attenuated and long-term. The externality seems relatively

154. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a
legislative program consistent with federal interests.”).
155. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1644 (2006). In this article, I identify a cost-internalization rationale for the
anticommandeering principle:
Anticommandeering doctrine vindicates federalism values . . . to the extent
that it forces the federal government to internalize more of the financial and
accountability costs associated with regulating. As law and economics posits,
actors that do not internalize the full costs of their behavior tend to engage in
too much of the behavior.
Id. (footnote omitted).
156. See id. at 1632. I question the Court’s accountability rationale for anticommandeering
doctrine:
Even after factoring in search costs and rational ignorance, it seems likely that
citizens who pay attention to public affairs and who care to inquire will be able
to discern which level of government is responsible for a government
regulation, and citizens who do not care to inquire may be largely beyond
judicial or political help on the accountability front.
Id.
157. Cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 2, at 153–54 (asking whether “the standard of ‘willingness
to pay’ [could] achieve the same success in constitutional law [as in cost–benefit analysis] by
limiting the feelings that count as interstate externalities”).
158. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
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insignificant. Moreover, in light of the forty-plus state criminal laws already
on the books, the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA)159 did not appear to
meaningfully address the problem.160 Justice Kennedy was almost certainly
right that the regulatory power of the states was “sufficient” to address it. 161
For the most part, the GFSZA seemed to be symbolic grandstanding by the
federal government.
Third, courts should impose a reasonableness inquiry in the context of
judicial review, in contrast to genuine rational basis review. Questions of
significance and meaningfulness are matters of judgment. Reasonable
people will often disagree about them. When reasonable people could differ
about the significance of a multistate collective action problem and about the
adequacy of Congress’s response, courts should uphold federal legislation in
light of the aforementioned presumption of constitutionality and the tradition
of judicial deference to Congress in federalism cases.162
A reasonableness inquiry, however, is not the same thing as genuine
rational basis review. Under a rational basis test, even Lopez may be
justifiable on collective action grounds. By contrast, a reasonableness
inquiry should require both a plausible theoretical rationale that a significant,
multistate collective action problem exists, and some empirical evidence to
support that rationale. 163 The stronger the theoretical rationale, the less
evidence should be required. And the less plausible the theoretical rationale,
the more evidence should be required.
For example, contrast the GFSZA with the ban on racial discrimination
in public accommodations imposed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.164 As
explained in Part I, it was at least reasonable to view the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as meaningfully addressing significant collective action problems
involving multiple states in light of the various ways in which Jim Crow laws
and policies in the South impeded the interstate travel of African-Americans
to Southern states on a temporary basis; distorted the allocation of labor and
capital from other parts of the nation; and encouraged the Great Migration of
African-Americans in the South to cities in the North.165 By maintaining
racial segregation, Southern states were imposing significant, material costs
on the rest of the nation.
159. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2006)).
160. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Indeed, over 40 States already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school grounds.”).
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
163. In constitutional litigation, the federal government should be permitted to supplement the
record compiled by Congress, particularly for statutes enacted before judicial imposition of
evidentiary demands.
164. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the Court held that the Commerce Clause justified provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibited racial discrimination by hotels and restaurants.
165. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
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Key provisions of the Affordable Care Act are also reasonably viewed
as meaningfully contributing to the solution of significant collective action
problems in light of the mobility or immobility of various participants in
health care and health insurance markets, including insurers, hospitals,
employers, healthy individuals, and unhealthy individuals.166 For example,
the minimum coverage provision is reasonably viewed as combating cost
shifting from the uninsured to other participants in health care markets.167
This cost shifting is likely interstate in scope because of the presence of
“insurance companies in multiple states and the phenomenon of cross-state
hospital use.”168 Consider as well the ACA provisions that prohibit insurance
companies from denying people coverage based on preexisting conditions
and discriminating against them based on their medical histories.169 These
provisions very likely solve collective action problems for the states by
facilitating labor mobility, discouraging the flight of insurance companies
from states that guarantee access to states that do not, and discouraging states
from free riding on the more generous health care systems of other states.170
In sum, the foregoing federalist objection to a collective action account
of the Commerce Clause warrants serious consideration. The objection
appropriately instructs collective action theorists either to defend a good
proxy to a collective action analysis, or to limit the universe of interstate
externalities that count as multistate collective action problems justifying
federal commerce power. Fortunately, resources are available to accomplish
the latter task in the context of judicial review. The decisive question in
Commerce Clause cases should be whether Congress had a reasonable basis
to believe that it was meaningfully addressing a significant, material
interstate externality. To support an affirmative answer, a reviewing court
could require Congress to proffer both a theoretical rationale and empirical
evidence.
To be sure, these resources are not fully determinate; they require
contestable judgment calls. But the same is true of any approach to the
commerce power that places at least some limits on federal power. Chief
Justice Rehnquist thus conceded in Lopez that “a determination whether an
intrastate activity is commercial or noncommercial may in some cases result
in legal uncertainty.”171 Echoing Chief Justice Marshall, however, he added
that “so long as Congress’[s] authority is limited to those powers enumerated
in the Constitution, and so long as those enumerated powers are interpreted

166.
note 6.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

For a more detailed collective action analysis of the ACA, see generally Siegel, supra
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 33.
See supra note 15.
See generally Siegel, supra note 6.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
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as having judicially enforceable outer limits, congressional legislation under
the Commerce Clause always will engender legal uncertainty.”172
Conclusion
Nationalists and federalists alike may be inclined to reject collective
action approaches to the Commerce Clause. Collective action theory seeks a
path between a regime of no judicially enforceable limits on the commerce
power and a regime of structurally arbitrary limits on the commerce power.
If one does not believe in judicial review of federalism questions, then one
should reject collective action approaches, or else should understand them as
directed at conscientious legislators, presidents, and citizens. If one does
believe in judicial review of federalism questions, and if one believes that
only relatively clear rules can meaningfully limit federal power, then one
should also reject collective action theory.
I have argued, however, that nationalists and federalists have more
reason to accept collective action theory than they may think. A collective
action approach justifies substantially more federal power than nationalists
may fear, particularly in light of material interstate externalities and the
presumption of constitutionality in the context of judicial review. A
collective action approach would also impose some structurally sensible
limits on the Commerce Clause, thereby speaking to the constitutional
commitments of federalists.
Collective action approaches largely
legitimate—and integrate different decades of—the constitutional regime in
which Americans have been living since 1937. Both nationalists and
federalists have played major roles in the construction of this regime.

172. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rehnquist then quoted McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).

